Murder, Culture, and Injustice: Four Sensational Cases in American History

Walter L. Hixson
Univ of Akron Bookstore, November 2000
Hardcover

Review
by Norah Rudin, Ph.D.

Walter Hixson’s new book, Murder, Culture, and Injustice: Four Sensational Cases in American History, is well written and meticulously researched. What is questionable is whether he has contributed any new information or even a novel perspective to the four notorious murder cases involving members of, variously, the Borden, Lindbergh, Sheppard, and Simpson families. In each of these instances, many books that exhaustively detail the cases already exist. Although Hixson has thoroughly reviewed the available material and, in fact, presents excellent and readable summaries of the human stories in each case, he contributes no new facts, theories, or perspectives.

From his introduction, and from comments interspersed throughout the book, it is clear that what the author hoped to contribute was a historical perspective. Unfortunately, this attempt falls somewhat short of its goal, and seems somewhat superficial in nature. Most of the historical analysis is summarized in his six page conclusion; it would seem that a journal article might have been a more appropriate vehicle than a book for conveying this perspective. However, even the historical context provides us with very little in the way of an in-depth comparison of how high-profile cases have been either handled or perceived throughout the last couple of centuries. That Lizzie Borden was probably acquitted because men in Victorian Massachusetts did not believe women capable of murder, that the conviction of Bruno Hauptmann relied on bungled evidence collection by the New Jersey police, and that a German Immigrant’s civil rights were violated in post-World War II America, that Sam Sheppard was convicted in the Ohio Press in the 1950’s because he was perceived as a spoiled rich boy, and that Johnnie Cochran played the race card to gain O.J. Simpson’s acquittal in the 1995 criminal trial, are hardly big secrets to anyone who follows famous criminal trials.

Most disturbing, however, is the author’s misunderstanding of the capabilities, limitations, and meaning of the physical evidence that was key to three of these four cases. Virtually no physical evidence was collected in the Borden case (in part, as Hixson correctly observes, due to Victorian social mores about invading a lady’s privacy), so very little exists about which to complain. Interestingly, however, this reviewer was hardly convinced by the evidence presented, physical or otherwise, that Lizzie Borden committed the murder of her father. Although certain events may well be interpreted to support that hypothesis, it also simply appears that no other viable suspects were ever identified. The interpretation of the main pieces of physical evidence in the Lindbergh case, a piece of wood from the ladder matching a joist in Hauptmann’s attic, and the handwriting of the ransom notes comparing favorably with his, were verified by independent forensic scientists a generation later, so we can have some confidence in the veracity of the conclusions. In an outrageous perversion of the capabilities of hair comparison, however, Hixson writes that "…microscopic analysis of the baby’s hair proved conclusively that the dead child had been Charles A. Lindbergh Jr." This kind of conclusion is simply not possible given the limitations of hair comparison and it is irresponsible to perpetuate the myth that it is. Similarly, in his analysis of the Simpson case, Hixson states that "The hard scientific evidence through DNA analysis could actually prove the guilt or innocence of a defendant." Before it is possible to understand the overwhelming evidence pointing to O.J. Simpson as the murderer of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman, one must first appreciate is that physical evidence can, at best, place a person at a scene, or two objects in contact with each other. The laboratory scientist can virtually never determine how or when the physical evidence came to be, and certainly not why it came to be. To misunderstand this basic concept is to potentially misconstrue the meaning of physical evidence in the context of any crime.

However, the main problems come in the Hixson’s analysis of the Sheppard case. The physical evidence in this case is among the most voluminous and complex of any. Added to that, the various analyses span half a century and many details have been lost or distorted. A basic misunderstanding however, is the implication that DNA can always uniquely identify an individual. While most scientists accept that each person’s DNA is unique, the ability of any test to individualize a stain to a person may be hampered by the limitations of the particular test or the evidence itself. In the Sheppard case, both these limitations existed. In fact, in the Nova special which Hixson cites, a respected DNA expert suggests that, "Given what we now know about most of the evidence, its history of handling and passing from one person to another, the results that we have, in my mind, are essentially worthless." Out of several examples, one of the most dangerous is Hixson’s conclusion that "… tests revealed evidence of sperm from two donors within the last three days of Marilyn’s life, presumably her husband and the rapist." If we are simply going to presume, why bother testing? Regardless, a straight reading of the DNA results from these samples reveals something quite different – that AT LEAST two individuals contributed to the sperm fraction of this sample, that Sam Sheppard was EXCLUDED as a donor, and that, for Richard Eberling to be included, at least THREE individuals would have had to be present. Given the possibilities for contamination of this evidence throughout the years, the results can hardly be taken seriously, much less conclusively. Many more such examples abound in the text. Interestingly, Hixson appears to accept as fact the story of a jailhouse informant fingering Eberling as the murderer, ignoring the reputation of such informants as notoriously unreliable sources. Eberling himself changed his story so many times over the years that it is impossible to separate fact from fantasy or even from bald-faced manipulation.

While Mr. Hixson is obviously a historian, not a scientist, if he is going to write about science, he has a certain obligation to his readers to learn about the basic limitations and capabilities of the tests and evidence upon which he is basing his historical analysis, and to request help from an expert to resolve complicated or disputed results. While those with a general interest in these crimes will find his summaries concise and readable, anyone with a more substantial interest will want to consult the abundant single-subject books about each. While the historical analysis is potentially interesting, it seems more an excuse than a reason for this particular volume. We just don’t get enough of it to justify a whole book.